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Abstract
The present research concerns the hypothesis that intuitive estimates of the arithmetic 
mean of a sample ofnumbers tend to increase as a function of the sample size; that is, 
they reflect a systematic sample size bias. A similar bias has been observed when people 
judge the average member of a group of people on an inferred
quantity (e.g., a disease risk; see Price, 2001; Price, Smith, & Lench, 2006). Until now, 
however, it has been unclear whether it would be observed when the stimuli were 
numbers, in which case the quantity need not be inferred, and “average” can be 
precisely defined as the arithmetic mean. In two experiments, participants estimated
the arithmetic mean of 12 samples of numbers. In the first experiment, samples of from 
5 to 20 numbers were presented simultaneously and participants quickly estimated their 
mean. In the second experiment, the numbers in each sample were presented 
sequentially. The results of both experiments confirmed the existence
of a systematic sample size bias.
Andrew R. Smith and Paul C. Price (2010) "Sample size bias in the estimation of means" 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 17, pp. 499-503 (ISSN: 1069-9384) version of record avaiable 
@ (doi:10.3758/PBR.17.4.499)
 
Sample size bias in the estimation of means 
 
Andrew r. Smith 
University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 
And 
Paull C. Price 
California State University, Fresno, California 
 
The present research concerns the hypothesis that intuitive estimates of the arithmetic mean of a sample of 
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experiment, the numbers in each sample were presented sequentially. The results of both experiments 




People must often make judgments about the 
average or typical member of a group on a single 
quantitative dimension. For example, a teacher might 
be asked by his students what the class average was on 
an exam. Or a survey respondent might be asked to 
report the average number of times she engages in a 
given behavior (e.g., consumes an alcoholic drink) per 
day, week, or year. Although previous research has 
found that such central tendency judgments tend to be 
accurate—a conclusion that we do not dispute—we 
hypothesize that they also reflect a systematic sample 
size bias. That is, they tend to increase as a function of 
the sample size, so that larger groups are judged to 
have greater central tendencies than smaller groups are. 
Furthermore, we believe that this is a fairly general bias 
that has implications for understanding a variety of 
judgment phenomena and also basic processes involved 
in quantitative reasoning and judgment. 
Early researchers who studied central tendency 
judgments conceptualized people as “intuitive 
statisticians” (Peterson & Beach, 1967) and found them 
to be quite ac- curate when estimating the arithmetic 
mean of a sample of numbers (Anderson, 1964; Beach 
& Swenson, 1966; Levin, 1975; Spencer, 1961, 1963). 
For example, Spencer’s (1963) participants estimated 
the mean of several sets of either 10 or 20 numbers 
that varied in terms of their variance and skewness. His 
overall finding was that “mean errors were remarkably 
low for all conditions” (p. 256). Beach and Swenson 
conducted a similar study with similar results, leading 
them to conclude that “the most important result of 
this experiment is the high degree of accuracy 
evidenced in [participants’] estimates” (p. 162). 
Recently, however, we have found evidence of a 
systematic sample size bias in people’s central tendency 
judgments.1 For example, Price (2001) showed 
participants descriptions of several fictional 
employees in terms of their risk factors for having a 
heart attack and asked the participants to judge the 
heart attack risk of the average employee. He found that 
the risk of the average employee was judged to be 
higher as the company size increased from 5 to 10 
employees, then again as the company size increased 
from 10 to 15 employees. In an extensive set of follow-
up studies, Price, Smith, and Lench (2006) found a 
similar sample size bias when the stimulus people were 
presented in photographs and participants judged the 
likelihood that the average group member would 
experience a wide variety of negative, positive, and even 
neutral events. In their final study, Price et al. observed 
the sample size bias when the stimuli were identical 
stick figures and participants estimated their average 
height. This result is important, because it casts doubt 
on two plausible explanations of the sample size bias. 
One is that people misunderstand their task to be that of 
judging the likelihood that at least one person in the 
group will experience the event in question. No such 
misunderstanding is possible for height judgments. The 
second is that people attend primarily to extreme (e.g., 
riskier, taller) individuals, or weight them more heavily 
in their judgments. Because the groups in this study 
consisted of identical stick figures, however, there were 















Price et al. (2006) suggested that the sample size bias 
occurs because people automatically encode the sample 
size and integrate it with their central tendency judgments. 
Such a general explanation suggests that the sample size 
bias should be a very general phenomenon. For example, it 
should be observed when people make intuitive estimates 
of the mean of a set of numbers, as in the intuitive 
statistics research. In fact, some of those data are 
consistent with this hypothesis. Levin (1975, 
Experiment 3) showed participants groups of numbers 
that were said to represent the percent price increase for 
randomly selected items in a store, and their task was to 
estimate the mean percent price increase. The estimated 
means for samples of 8, 16, 32, and 64 items were 45.7, 
46.2, 48.1, and 49.7, respectively. Although there 
appears to have been a sample size bias, the stimuli 
were not constructed, nor the data analyzed, to test this 
hypothesis specifically. 
The primary goal of the present study, therefore, was 
to systematically test the hypothesis that there is a sample 
size bias in people’s intuitive estimates of the mean of a 
set of numbers. It is quite possible that we will not 
observe the sample size bias for this task. Recall that in 
the work of Price and colleagues (Price, 2001; Price et 
al., 2006), each stimulus individual’s standing on the 
quantitative dimension of interest had to be estimated 
or inferred, and the concept of central tendency was 
generally ill-defined. It may be only under these 
conditions that the sample size is integrated with central 
tendency judgments. By contrast, the standing of a 
numerical stimulus on the dimension of number is 
straightforward—no inference is necessary—and the 
concept of central tendency can be defined precisely. 
Under these conditions, it is possible that participants 






participants. Fifty-two participants from the University of Iowa 
and 85 participants from California State University, Fresno, 
participated in this study as partial fulfillment of a course 
requirement.2 
Stimuli. Each participant estimated the mean of 12 samples of 
numbers that varied in terms of both their sample size (5, 10, 15, 
or 20) and mean (20, 30, or 40). To create these samples, we began 
with a sample of five numbers (9.4, 15.1, 17.2, 26.5, and 31.8) that 
had a mean of 20. To create additional samples of five numbers with 
to make a precise calculation. Participants then completed one 
practice estimation trial under a time limit before proceeding to 
the 12 regular estimation trials. 
Participants were randomly assigned to see one of the four 
stimulus sets of 12 samples. The samples were presented in a new 
random order for each participant. Each sample was displayed in 
the center of the screen in a grid with 5 rows and 4 columns. 
Samples with fewer than 20 numbers filled the grid starting from 
the leftmost column. The participants responded by typing their 
estimates using the number pad of the keyboard. Once they typed in 
their estimates, they pressed the enter key to see the next sample. 
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two time limit 
conditions. In the constant-time-per-sample condition, they had 
5,000 msec per sample to make their estimates. This held the time 
per sample constant, but allowed the time per number to vary. In the 
constant-time-per-number condition, they had 500 msec per 
number in the sample (e.g., the sample of 5 numbers was 
displayed for 2,500 msec). This held the time per number constant 
but allowed the time per sample to vary. On each trial in both time 
limit conditions, a vertical bar appeared to the right of the number 
grid. When the trial began, the bar started becoming shorter, 
completely disappearing when the allotted time was up. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Three participants were dropped from the analyses be- 
cause their responses indicated they either misunderstood 
their task or were not attempting to provide accurate 
estimates. We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA 
with sample size and objective mean as within-subjects 
factors and stimulus set and timing condition as 
between- subjects factors. Focusing on the linear 
contrasts, this analysis confirmed that there was a main 
effect of sample 
size [F(1,126) 5 6.33, p 5 .013, η2 5 .05]. As Figure 1 
shows, participants’ estimates tended to increase as the 
size of the sample increased. The participants were 
sensitive to the objective mean of the samples, as 
evidenced by 
the significant main effect of objective mean [F(1,126) 5 
61.35, p , .001, η2 5 .33]. There was no main effect of 
stimulus set [F(3,126) 5 0.30, p 5 .82, η2 5 .007]. There 
was a marginally significant main effect of timing 
condition [F(1,126) 5 2.87, p 5 .09, η2 5 .02], 
indicating that participants in the constant-time-per-
number condition gave higher estimates than 






means of 30 and 40, we added 10 and 20 to each of the original five 
numbers. Then to create samples of 10, 15, and 20, we repeated the 
numbers in each sample of five either two, three, or four times. Thus, 
we varied the size and mean of the samples without augmenting the 
variability or range. To ensure that there was nothing peculiar about 
the sample of five numbers that we started with, we created three 
more stimulus sets of 12 samples, based on slightly different initial 
samples of five numbers. 
Design and procedure. All the instructions and stimuli were 
presented using a personal computer. Participants were instructed 
that they would be estimating the arithmetic mean of several samples 
of numbers. To ensure that participants understood what we meant 
by arithmetic mean, we provided an example in the instructions and 
















  20 
tally computed the mean of a small set of numbers (e.g., 5, 10, and 
15). Additional instructions indicated that they would have to make 
intuitive estimates for samples that would be presented too quickly 
Figure 1. mean estimates for all participants in Experiment 1 
as a function of sample size and objective mean. Error bars rep- 

















   
 
time-per-sample condition. There were no significant 
interactions. 
Overall, the accuracy of the participants’ estimates 
was fairly poor. The mean absolute deviation (MAD) for 
all judgments was 17.60 (SD 5 44.76). This raises the 
concern that the sample size bias might be driven by a 
relatively small number of participants who gave 
particularly inaccurate estimates. To rule out this 
explanation, we first identified extreme responses that 
were smaller than 10 or larger than 100. Nearly all 
stimulus numbers were within this range, so mean 
estimates falling outside of it were assumed to be the 
result of typing errors, a misunderstanding of the task, or 
a lack of motivation to pro- vide accurate responses. In 
all, 210 of the 1,644 estimates (12.77%) were classified 
as extreme. We then focused a second analysis on those 
participants who did not give any extreme responses (n 5 
83). Not surprisingly, the MAD of the remaining 
participants was much lower and less variable (M 5 
4.84, SD 5 2.21; see Figure 2). Among these more 
accurate participants, there was still a significant effect of 
both sample size [F(1,75) 5 10.26, p 5 .002, η2 5 
.12] and objective mean [F(1,75) 5 773.12, p , .001, 
p 5 .91]. There were no other significant main effects 
or interactions. 
A possible explanation for the sample size bias is that 
people attend to, and base their estimates on, a subset of 
the largest numbers in the sample. For example, the mean 
of the five largest numbers in each sample does, in fact, 
increase as the sample size increases. Not only would 
this produce a sample size bias, it should also result in 
a tendency toward overestimation. Although there was a 
tendency toward overestimation when participants who 
gave extreme responses remained in the analysis, the 
tendency reversed when these participants were 
eliminated. Among the most accurate participants, 
therefore, there was both a sample size bias and a 
tendency toward under- estimation; the mean signed 
deviation of their estimates was significantly less than 
zero (M 5 21.73, SD 5 2.88) [t(82) 5 5.47, p , .001]. 
This argues against the idea that the sample size bias 








These results revealed a sample size bias for intuitive 
estimates of the arithmetic mean of groups of numbers. 
This effect cannot be attributed to the variability of the 
numbers, a small number of participants who gave 
inaccurate responses, or a tendency to focus on a 
subset of the largest numbers in each sample. It could be 
attributed, however, to the envelope area of the 
numbers—the area of the smallest polygon that contains 





In Experiment 2, we addressed the issue of envelope 
area as a confounding variable in a way that emphasizes 
the generality of the sample size bias. Specifically, we 




participants. One hundred twenty undergraduate psychology 
students at California State University, Fresno, participated as 
partial fulfillment of a course requirement. 
Design and procedure. Aside from presenting the numbers 
sequentially rather than simultaneously, the design and 
procedures were essentially the same as in Experiment 1. After 
reading instructions about their task, the participants completed 
the same simple computational problems and practice estimation 
trial used in Experiment 1. They then proceeded to the 12 regular 
estimation trials. 
Each estimation trial began with a white plus sign presented in the 
middle of a blue background. This served as a fixation point. When 
the participant pressed the enter key, the numbers in the sample 
appeared at the fixation point, with a brief intertrial interval (ITI). 
After all the numbers in the sample were presented, the participant 
was prompted to enter his or her estimate of the mean, at which point 
the next trial began. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two timing 
conditions. In the constant-time-per-number condition, each number 
was presented for 1,000 msec, with an ITI of 500 msec. This held the 
time per number constant. In the constant-time-per-sample condition, 
each number was presented for 1,000 msec but the ITI was 




We submitted the estimates of all participants to a re- 
peated measures ANOVA, as described in Experiment 1. 
Again, there was a significant linear effect of sample size 
[F(1,112) 5 10.58, p 5 .002, η2 5 .09]. Participants’ es- 
timates tended to increase as the size of the sample in- 
creased (see Figure 3). There was also a significant effect 
of objective mean [F(1,112) 5 51.59, p , .001, η2 5 .32]. 
There were no other significant main effects or interac- 
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  20 18.08, SD 5 47.13), because the full data set included 
several participants who made estimates lower than 10 
and greater than 100. After excluding 34 participants who 
made at least one extreme estimate, the MAD of the re- 
maining participants was much lower and less variable 
(M 5 5.09, SD 5 4.00; see Figure 4). Among these more 
accurate participants, there was still a significant effect 
of both objective mean [F(1,78) 5 1,034.12, p , .001, η2 
Figure 2. mean estimates for accurate responders in Experi- 
ment 1 as a function of sample size and objective mean. Error 
bars represent 61 standard error. 
p 5 .93] and sample size [F(1,78) 5 6.78, p 5 .01, 
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River than did people who first drew short lines. From 
this perspective, the sample size bias might occur because 
the sample size activates a representation of a larger or 
smaller magnitude, which is then assimilated into people’s 
central tendency judgments. 
Of course, this explanation requires that sample size 
activate a magnitude representation and that it do so 
regardless of whether the individual stimulus elements 
are presented simultaneously or sequentially. Although 
we have provided no direct evidence for this 
assumption here, we should note that event frequency 
does appear to be encoded fairly automatically (Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979). People make reasonably accurate 
frequency estimates for stimuli that were presented 
sequentially and for which they 
Figure 3. mean estimates for all participants in Experiment 2 
as a function of sample size and objective mean. Error bars rep- 
resent 61 standard error. 
 
 
As in Experiment 1, there was a marginally significant 
tendency to underestimate the sample mean among the 
more accurate participants; the mean signed deviation of 
mean estimates was 20.88 (SD 5 4.36) [t(85) 5 1.88, 
p 5 .06]. Therefore, it is unlikely that the sample size bias 
occurs because people focus on the largest numbers in 





In two experiments, we observed our hypothesized 
effect of sample size on people’s intuitive estimates of 
the means of samples of numbers. These experiments 
were designed to control several potential 
confounding variables, including the variability of the 
numbers and their spatial and temporal distribution. 
We were also able to demonstrate that the sample size 
bias occurs for people who make relatively accurate 
responses and that the bias cannot be explained by a 
tendency to focus on a subset of the largest numbers in 
each sample. 
We believe that any plausible theory of the sample size 
bias must take into account the generality of the effect. 
We have observed it for judgments about heart attack risk 
based on written profiles (Price, 2001), risk and 
likelihood judgments based on group photographs (Price 
et al., 
had no conscious intention to encode frequency 
information (Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986). 
Furthermore, research on numerosity perception 
generally supports the idea that people form 
representations independent of the sensory modality in 
which the stimuli are presented and whether or not the 
presentation of individual stimulus elements is 
simultaneous or sequential (Barth, Kanwisher, & Spelke, 
2003). So it seems likely that, if drawing a long or 
short line can activate a corresponding magnitude rep- 
resentation, being presented with a small or large sample 
can do the same. Consistent with this idea is other research 
showing an effect of irrelevant numerosity information on 
quantitative judgments (Friedenberg & Limratana, 2005; 
Pelham, Sumarta, & Myaskovsky, 1994). 
The magnitude priming explanation is precise enough 
to suggest several additional hypotheses about the sample 
size bias. One is that if sample size results in a modality- 
independent magnitude representation, it should affect 
other kinds of judgments and responses. Consider that 
Oppenheimer et al. (2008) showed that drawing a long 
or short line affected not only people’s estimates of the 
length of the Mississippi River, but also their behavior in 
a word completion task. For example, those who drew a 
long line were more likely to complete the fragment all 
to create the word tall. Would this effect be observed for 
people who had just been presented with samples of 






2006), estimates of the heights of identical stick figures 
(Price et al., 2006), and now for estimates of the means of 
samples of numbers presented both simultaneously and 
sequentially. 
One explanation that might account for all of these 
results—a variation on the idea that people automatically 
integrate sample size into their central tendency judgments 
(Price et al., 2006)—is based on the concept of magni- 
tude priming (Oppenheimer, LeBoeuf, & Brewer, 2008). 
The idea is that presenting people with a small or large 
quantity can activate a modality-independent representa- 


















  20 
quantitative judgments. For example, Oppenheimer et al. 
showed that people who first drew long lines tended to 
provide higher estimates for the length of the Mississippi 
Figure 4. mean estimates for accurate responders in Experi- 
ment 2 as a function of sample size and objective mean. Error 























relative sample size rather than the absolute sample size. 
As Oppenheimer et al. pointed out, the fact that drawing a 
line on a piece of paper can affect estimates of the length 
of the Mississippi River suggests a unit-free representation 
of magnitude that must necessarily be context dependent. 
In our paradigm, a sample of 10 might elicit very different 
estimates when presented with samples of 6 and 8 than 
when presented with samples of 20 and 30. 
Regardless, the sample size bias appears to be quite 
general and has implications for understanding judgments 
in various contexts. We have already noted that the sample 
size bias can contribute to the magnitude of comparative 
optimism—people’s tendency to judge themselves to be 
at lower risk than their peers for negative events (Price, 
2001; Price et al., 2006). This is because judgments about 
oneself are judgments about a very small sample and 
judgments about one’s peers are judgments about a very 
large sample. Similarly, it might contribute to high 
school and college students’ tendency to overestimate 
the extent to which their peers use drugs and practice 
unsafe sex (e.g., Page, Hammermeister, & Scanlan, 
2000). Again, in this research, participants are 
generally asked to make judgments about themselves (a 
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1. Elsewhere, we have referred to this phenomenon as the group size 
effect. We now believe that sample size bias is more descriptive and em- 
phasizes its generality. 
2. Estimates given by participants from the University of Iowa and 
California State University, Fresno, did not differ in any substantial way. 
Most importantly, university affiliation did not interact with sample 
size. 
 
 
